A worldwidemental health crisis is expected, as millions worldwide fear death and disease while being forced into repeated isolation. Thus, there is a need for new proactive approaches to improve mental resilience and prevent mental health conditions. Since the 1990s, art has emerged as an alternative mental health therapy in the United States and Europe, becoming part of the social care agenda. This article focuses on how visual esthetic experiences can create similar patterns of neuronal activity as those observed when (...) the reward system is activated. The activation of the reward structures could have a stress buffering effect, given the interdependence observed between the reward and stress systems. Therefore, could visual esthetic experiences stimulate mental resilience? And if this were the case, could art-based interventions be offered for mental health in the context of COVID-19 and beyond? (shrink)

BackgroundRecent advancements in neuroscientific techniques have allowed us to make huge progress in our understanding of memories, and in turn has paved the way for new memory modification technologies that can modulate memories with a degree of precision, which was not previously possible. With advancements in such techniques, new and critical ethical questions have emerged. Understanding and framing these ethical questions within the current philosophical theories is crucial in order to systematically examine them as we translate these techniques to the (...) clinic.Main bodyIn this paper, we discuss the ethical implications of modern neuroscience techniques that aim to disrupt or enhance memories. We attempt to frame the MMTs in the context of existing ethical philosophical theories to provide a cohesive analysis of the myriad of ethical quagmires that might emerge from such technologies. We argue the application of Aristotle’s Golden Mean and multiple accounts of authenticity are useful in approaching the ethical questions surrounding MMTs. We then propose a framework in which ethical considerations can be systematically examined. Lastly, we provide caveats and considerations for the use of this framework. Overall, we provide a practical approach for the ethical use of MMTs depending on the situation.ConclusionWhile at face value, our model appears to put severe limitations on the application of MMTs, we are not completely opposed to their use, but rather our framework guides the agent to consider the implications before making any decisions. Most importantly, we argue that the use of MMTs does not reduce the responsibility of the initial decision, and the agent must accept the post-MMT self as the new “true self” regardless of the outcome. As the developmental trajectory of MMTs suggests we are getting closer to practical clinical applications, ethical concerns across a wide range of disciplines need to be addressed to develop best strategies and policies when dealing with MMTs. If this can be achieved, we believe the ethical use of MMTs is not only possible but would also be of tremendous benefit to many people suffering from memory-related mental disorders. (shrink)

In his stimulating and provocative collection of essays, Globalization and Justice, Kai Nielsen defends a cosmopolitan account of global justice. On the cosmopolitan view, as Nielsen understands it, individuals are entitled to equal consideration regardless of citizenship or nationality and global institutions should be arranged in such a way that each person's interest is given equal consideration. Nielsen's defense of cosmopolitan justice in this collection will be of no surprise to readers familiar with his socialist egalitarian commitments. Indeed, the internationalism (...) underlying socialism, Nielsen would argue, naturally entails the cosmopolitan account of justice. (shrink)

Ben shu jie shao le gong zi zhen, wei yuan, yan fu, kang you wei, tan si tong, liang qi chao, chen tian hua, zhang bing lin deng wan qing si xiang jia de zhe xue si xiang.

90 nian dai, Du Weiming xian sheng de geng duo jing li zai yu kai zhan "wen hua Zhongguo" de lun yu."Wen hua Zhongguo" zhuo mo zui duo de shi ru jia de ren wen jing shen, yi jiu zheng jiang ru jia ru shi de jia zhi qu xiang he fan su ren wen zhu yi hun wei yi tan de yin xiang, tu xian ru jia yi mai xiang cheng de pi pan jing shen.

En el Nuevo Testamento griego, el término "kalós" (hermoso, bello) aparece 99 veces y el término "agathós" (bueno), 104. Casi con la misma frecuencia. Se ha traducido y se traduce "kalós" por bueno, lo cual no es exacto. Parece importante retener que Cristo hubiera utilizado tantas veces el concepto de belleza o hermosura, y que invitara al hombre a hacer obras hermosas, a realizar la belleza en su vida. Por eso, según el título de este libro (de 285 págs.), se (...) trata de la belleza no solo que corresponde a la persona de Cristo, sino también la que él comunica a las demás personas, la que se refiere a nosotros por ser obras suyas. Jesús habla de obras "kalá" (hermosas), de frutos "kaloùs" (hermosos) o de corazón "kalê kaì agathê" (hermoso y bueno). La Antigüedad griega también hablaba del hombre "kalòkagathós". Es verdad que todo lo bello es bueno, y viceversa, pero hay que matizar. El propio Jesús se autodenomina "kalós", hermoso, al hablar de sí mismo en el Evangelio diciendo que es el pastor bello. Una palabra clave del presente libro es “razonar”. Los Evangelios son muy escuetos, dicen solo lo imprescindible, fueron vertidos además en otro idioma distinto del que habló Jesús. Hay aspectos que no son comprendidos si no se tiene en cuenta lo razonable. Para comprender el Evangelio no basta con atender al estricto dato teológico contenido en sus textos, tan condensados, sino que es preciso hacer al mismo tiempo una sutil labor filosófica que permita descubrir lo que implícitamente se contiene en ellos. Esta necesaria tarea —liberada de todo fundamentalismo— muestra lo que es más razonable para saber quién y cómo es Cristo. Por ello el libro lleva como subtítulo "Una comprensión filosófica del Evangelio". Y lo hace sirviéndose principalmente de la filosofía de Marías y Ortega, lo cual —a pesar de ser el instrumento intelectual que mejor permite comprender el Cristianismo— no se había realizado todavía. Gracias a ese método, lo primero que se comprende es precisamente la extraordinaria belleza de Cristo y la que comunica a sus discípulos y a quien se hace su servidor, llamado por San Pablo "kalòs", hermoso. Circula la idea, incluso en algunos ambientes católicos, de que la razón y, por supuesto, la filosofía no son aptas para comprender el Evangelio. Este libro, más filosófico que teológico, reivindica el insoslayable papel de la razón, de la filosofía, de lo razonable, para comprender los Evangelios, y debe leerse como un "ensayo de Cristología según la razón vital". Sus consideraciones están hechas a la luz de la razón. No de la razón abstracta, propia del racionalismo, que poco o nada tiene que ver con ella, sino de la razón vital; de la razón sin más. De la razón que conduce a la fe; de la fe que conduce a la razón. El dato histórico, irrefragable, de los cuatro Evangelios postulaba que se estudiara iluminándolo con la razón, sin la cual la fe queda mutilada y coja, abstracta, sin luz propia. Pero la razón había sido frecuentemente vista en ámbitos clericales con malos ojos, con cierta sospecha, sin darse cuenta de que, si es auténtica —y no algo reduccionista—, ilumina, clarifica, disipa las tinieblas. Especialmente porque, en última instancia, la razón procede del Logos, Cristo, la Luz, la Razón por antonomasia, fuente y origen de ella. En el Prólogo de San Juan se unen la razón y la vida; se trata no de una razón abstracta, sino vital. El "Lógos" es entonces la Razón vital. Lejos de ser enemiga de la vida, como sostenían los irracionalistas, la razón es una función vital. Quien recibe al "Lógos" con fe fundada en el amor debe esforzarse por intentar entenderlo con la razón, por buscar su inteligencia. El "Lógos", Cristo, ilumina a quien lo recibe para que se produzca esa comprensión. Los griegos definían al hombre como "zôon lógon échon", el viviente que tiene logos, que tiene razón. Cristo se presenta como el Logos, la Vida ("Zoé") que ha creado a su imagen y semejanza a ese viviente que tiene logos. Luego la razón no se debe subestimar o despreciar, es algo divino; Dios, fuente y origen de toda razón, la Razón misma, desea ser comprendido mediante ella, depositada en cada hombre. «Si la Sabiduría es Dios, el verdadero filósofo es el que ama a Dios», escribe San Agustín. Porque el filósofo es el que ama la Sabiduría, Dios. Jesús dice que «la Sabiduría se ha justificado por sus obras», que «la Sabiduría se ha justificado por todos sus hijos». Los hijos de la Sabiduría, de Cristo, la aman, la justifican, la acreditan, la razonan porque son filósofos. Y la filosofía, el amor a la Sabiduría, es absolutamente necesaria e imprescindible para comprender a Cristo y su Evangelio, que siempre enseña lo razonable. (shrink)

The polluter pays principle (PPP) has the form of a reparative principle. It holds that since some countries have historically contributed more to global warming than others, these countries have the follow-up responsibility now to do more to address climate change. Yet in the climate justice debate, PPP is often rejected for two reasons. First, so the objection goes, it wrongly burdens present-day individuals because the actions of their predecessors. This is the unfairness objection. The second objection is that early (...) polluters were not aware of the harm that they were doing, and so ought not to be held culpable. This is the objection from excusable ignorance. In this commentary, I defend PPP against these two objections. The aim of this short reflection is not to provide a full justification of PPP, or to respond to all objections that have been made against it. My more limited but, I hope, important goal is to show that PPP is neither immediately unfair (in making innocent parties pay) nor immediately unreasonable (in making excusably ignorant parties pay) as is commonly noted, and is therefore worthy of further consideration as a principle of climate justice. (shrink)

We investigate whether ordinary quantification over objects is an extensional phenomenon, or rather creates non-extensional contexts; each claim having been propounded by prominent philosophers. It turns out that the question only makes sense relative to a background theory of syntax and semantics (here called a grammar) that goes well beyond the inductive definition of formulas and the recursive definition of satisfaction. Two schemas for building quantificational grammars are developed, one that invariably constructs extensional grammars (in which quantification, in particular, thus (...) behaves extensionally) and another that only generates non-extensional grammars (and in which quantification is responsible for the failure of extensionality). We then ask whether there are reasons to favor one of these grammar schemas over the other, and examine an argument according to which the proper formalization of deictic utterances requires adoption of non-extensional grammars. (shrink)

I investigate whether Wittgenstein’s “weakly exclusive” Tractarian semantics (as reconstructed by Rogers and Wehmeier) is compositional. In both Tarskian and Wittgensteinian semantics, one has the choice of either working exclusively with total variable assignments or allowing partial assignments; the choice has no bearing on the compositionality of Tarskian semantics, but turns out to make a difference in the Wittgensteinian case. Some philosophical ramifications of this observation are discussed.

This article seeks to clarify the purpose of high-stakes exam and its relationship with teaching and learning by elucidating the educational thought of the eminent neo-Confucian thinker Zhu...

On what we may call the institutional approach to justice, the most important duty of justice that individuals have is the duty to establish just institutions when they are absent. How should we understand this institutional duty in relation to more personal moral actions, such as taking direct personal action to mitigate institutional failures? Is this institutional duty a necessary responsibility of justice? Is it sufficient? I will discuss this question in the context of climate change: what responsibilities of justice (...) do individual actors have when their state is not complying with an ideal of just emissions? Do they have the duty to do what they reasonably can to reduce their personal direct emissions, perhaps even picking up the slack of non-compliers? Or is their duty of justice primarily that of doing their part to establish a just regulatory framework? I will examine some options of personal responsibility in response to climate change and argue that the most important duty is that of working to bring about better institutions. Taking direct personal action can be helpful, but not when they distract us from working towards institutional reform. (shrink)

Ben shu quan mian chan shu zhu xi de li xue yu ke xue si xiang,Te bie jiu zhu xi zhong shi zi ran yan jiu,Shen ru ke xue tan suo,Chuang xin ke xue si xiang,Chuan bo zi ran zhi shi yi ji zhu xi li xue de ke xue jia zhi zhan kai ju ti de lun shu,Chong fen ken ding zhu xi ke xue si xiang dui yu hou shi ke ji fa zhan de zhong yao zuo yong,Yi (...) qi dui jin tian de ke ji yu wen hua de fa zhan zhu ru yuan tou huo shui. (shrink)

1. Xin yi shu chuang zuo lun, Xin yi shu lun ji -- 2. Mian xiang sheng huo, Lun yi shu de ji qiao -- 3. Yi yi dang shi -- 4. Xi wen le jian -- 5. Ge er bu ge -- 6. Lun Feng jie -- 7. Kai xin yue shi -- 8. Bu dao ding dian, Shen mei de min gan -- 9. Zai zai tan suo -- 10. Liao ran yu xin -- 11. Shen mei tan (...) -- 12. Si zeng xiang shi, Yi shen er ren -- 13. Shen mei xin tai -- 14. Hui jian zi ji -- 15. Diao su diao su -- 16. "Fu huo" de fu huo -- 17. Dong fang ji bai -- 18. Shen yu wu you -- 19. Tu na ying hua -- 20. Qu yu wu xie -- 21. Shu xin, ti ci xuan -- 22. Duan jian can pian. (shrink)

The issue of emotion is discussed in three stages in this article. Thus, emotion is built on a realistic and explanatory basis. In the first stage, the relationship between the physiological structure of the human brain and emotion is emphasized. The connection between the lower/primitive brain (the region/emotion center where emotions arise) and the upper/developed brain (mind-logic center, prefrontal lobe) is mentioned. Secondly, the emotional and mental development of human according to Jean Piaget's Mental Development Theory is explained. In the (...) emotional / intuitive period of 4-7 years (Emotional Intuition), while the person is completely under the influence of emotions, at the age of 7-11, he becomes aware of a concrete world accompanying emotions and passes to the Concrete Operations Period. It experiences the universe by "experiment" in the concrete operational period. And at the age of 11-17, the human reaches the Abstract Operations Period with the addition of reason and logic to his mental structure, which he built by putting a concrete universe on the core of emotions. Emotion is one of the most important functions of the human brain, and the reasoning system has evolved as an extension of the emotional system. Emotion plays different roles in the reasoning process. Emotion can increase the weight of a proposition, affecting the result in favor of that proposition. Emotion also helps in the process of remembering the many facts that need to be taken into account in order to make a decision. It has been explained through examples that emotion has a very important function in reasoning and that the mind is also important in controlling emotions. Again, emotion can help the mind / logic process scientific knowledge correctly and make good decisions. (shrink)

Ben shu dui Luling Wang xue de yan jiu, zhu yao cong yi xia liang fang mian zhan kai: shou xian, zhong dian jie shao le ti chu Luling Wang xue de li lun yi ju he Luling Wang xue fa zhan de ge ge jie duan de jie ding, te dian ji qi zhu yao de dai biao ren wu. Qi ci, ju ti lun shu le Luling Wang xue fa zhan de ge ge jie duan de zui zhu (...) yao dai biao ren wu de zhi xue li lu, xin xue si xiang, jing xue te dian. Tong guo dui Luling Wang xue zong ti shang de yan jiu, gai kuo he zheng li yi ji dui ge ge fa zhan jie duan zhu yao de dai biao ren wu Wang xue si xiang de bu tong shi jiao de tan tao chan fa, cong zong ti shang rang shi ren jiao wei xi tong de liao jie Luling Wang xue de gai mao ji qi cao chuang, fa zhan, ding sheng ji shi wei de li shi guo cheng he zhong yao dai biao ren wu de Wang xue si xiang. Tong shi, zai qian mian yan jiu de ji chu shang, dui Luling Wang xue zai Jiang you Wang xue nai zhi Yangming hou xue fa zhan guo cheng zhong de zhong yao di wei yi ji dui zhong wan Ming ru xue si xiang fa zhan de ying xiang zuo le zong jie. (shrink)

In the current crisis of liberal democracy, Confucianism has been cited as offering superior alternative models of government. With the resources from Dewey’s Pragmatism, this paper defends democracy, which should not be equated to de facto liberal democracies, as desirable for Confucian societies. It examines the affinities between Confucian and Dewey’s conception of the person and community and argues for an understanding of democratic values that brings together Dewey’s democratic values and Confucian ideals of personal cultivation and virtuous governance.

Explains the ethical principles of the ancient Greek philosophy known as Stoicism and shows how it can change our understanding of contemporary issues such as environmental sustainability, social justice, and global capitalism.

Since the publication of J. A. Hobson’s (1858–1940) Imperialism: A Study in 1902, the text has been studied—even celebrated—as a liberal or proto-Marxist critique of modern empires. This reputation stands in some tension with the text itself, which defends various forms of imperial domination. While scholars have addressed this tension, they remain divided over how best to understand Hobson’s imperial commitments. Offering a new response to this debate, I argue that a key dimension of Imperialism has been overlooked—namely, Hobson’s conception (...) of humanity as stratified into a hierarchy of racial “souls.” This deeply committed view of human difference undergirded Hobson’s arguments about the moral and practical limits of Western imperial power. This article shows how Hobson articulated imperialism as the “parasitic” rule of whites over the nonwhite world—the solution to which was not the rejection of empire but the reform of white imperial power in accordance with his normative vision of global racial hierarchy. This recovery reveals the redemptive critique at the core of Imperialism and enables us to more readily grasp the text as a form of imperial apologetics. The article concludes with the suggestion that Hobson is better understood not as a liberal- or socialist-imperialist but as a proponent of racial capitalism on a global scale. (shrink)

It is a commonplace of the history of analytic philosophy that Carnap swiftly adopted Tarskian semantics in the mid-1930s. There is no doubt that, in a very general sense, this is true. But to what extent are the innovative technical details characteristic of Tarski's method, specifically the handling of quantification by way of a satisfaction relation between formulas and variable assignments, reflected in Carnap's writings on semantics? Curiously enough, their essentials are in place just before Carnap took the purported Tarskian (...) turn, namely in the definition of analyticity he formulated some time between September 1932 and April 1933, but are missing from his publications on semantics after 1935 until the final chapter of Meaning and Necessity of 1947, at which point we find Carnap reverting to the use of specifically Tarskian techniques in the context of his novel semantics for quantified modal languages. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Millennium Jahrgang: 12 Heft: 1 Seiten: 155-178.

Assuming an international commitment to intervene in severe and urgent humanitarian emergencies, as expressed by the doctrine ‘The Responsibility to Protect’, I discuss two objections that the duty to intervene is nonetheless a duty that is easily limited by other moral considerations. One objection is that this duty will exceed the reasonable limits of any obligation given the high personal cost of intervention. The other objection is that any duty to intervene will be an imperfect duty, and therefore not a (...) duty that is ascribed to and demandable of any specific actor. I will argue that these objections do not undermine the principle of the responsibility to protect. (shrink)

This essay performs a comparative reading of the themes of language, otherness and subjectivity in the work of Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Lacan. Their focuses on the place and role of an ethical subjectivity who is profoundly affected and displaced by the (non)presence of the absolute Other provide apt philosophical material for comparison and contrast. Through a close analysis of the important philosophical and psychoanalytic themes in Levinas’ early work Totality and Infinity and Lacan’s Seminar VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, (...) I demonstrate how the different articulations of alterity in both influence their separate conceptions of the possibility of ethics in relation to decentered notions of subjectivity. In reading both, I argue that Lacan’s treatment of otherness and the eccentric nature of language provides a reimaging of certain gaps in Levinas. In return, I position Levinas as being able to provide a notion of ethical community that Lacan leaves out. (shrink)

Background Licensed nurses working in long-term care facilities experience ethical challenges if not resolved can lead to moral distress. There is a lack of an English-language validated tool to adequately measure moral distress in the long-term care setting. Aims To describe the modification and psychometric evaluation of the Moral Distress Questionnaire. Methods Instrument development and psychometric evaluation. Internal consistency using Cronbach’s α to establish reliability was conducted using SPSS version 27.0 while SPSS Amos version 27.0 was used to perform a (...) confirmatory factor analysis of the Moral Distress Questionnaire Participants A national sample of US-licensed nurses who provided direct resident care in long-term care settings were recruited via a targeted sampling method using Facebook from 7 December 2020 to 7 March 2021. Ethical Consideration The study was approved by the university’s human research protection program. Informed consent was provided to all participants. Results A total of 215 participants completed the surveys. Confirmatory analysis indicated that the 21-item scale with a 4-factor structure for the Moral Distress Questionnaire model met the established criteria and demonstrates an acceptable model fit (CMIN/DF = 2.0, CFI = 0.82, TLI = 0.77, RMSEA = 0.07). Factor loadings for each item depict a moderate to a strong relationship (range 0.36–0.70) with the given underlying construct. Cronbach’s α coefficient was 0.87 for the overall scale and 0.60–0.74 for its subscales which demonstrate good reliabilities. Discussion This is the first English-language validated tool to adequately measure moral distress in the long-term care setting experienced by US long-term care nurses. This reliable and well-validated tool will help identify moral distress situations experienced by US long-term care nurses. Conclusion The modified 21-item English version of the Moral Distress Questionnaire is reliable tool that demonstrates good psychometric properties to validly measure sources of moral distress among direct resident care nurses. (shrink)

Psychological egoists deny that men ever voluntarily act to promote the interests of others as an end in itself or ever act in such a way that they have the same regard for others as they have for themselves. [...] This theory has a long history and was supposedly decisively refuted by Butler. Yet it continues to haunt the scene. I want, in the tradition of Butler but not in his manner, to try to set out a short snappy but (...) definitive refutation of psychological egoism which will also show why it has such a hold on people. (shrink)

In 'The Standard Picture and its Discontents', Mark Greenberg remarks that the typical way that legal theorists think about legal obligations does not sit well with the way the common law works. I argue that Alexander's and Sherwin’s Rule Model of precedent can deal with all the problems that Greenberg accuses the Standard Picture of having. Nonetheless, I further argue that combining the Standard Picture and the Rule Model ultimately leads to another problem: the inability of the Standard Picture – (...) Rule Model to separate rule from dicta. (shrink)

This paper considers the connections between the Statehood/recognition debate in international law and social ontology. I aim to show that certain theories of social ontology, which I call Groupjective Internalism, can be used to defend Constitutive Theories of Statehood. Among philosophers whom I consider committed to Groupjective Internalism are major figures in the field: Searle, Gilbert and Tuomela. This is an interesting result as Constitutive Theories are generally looked upon with suspicion in international law.