A worldwidemental health crisis is expected, as millions worldwide fear death and disease while being forced into repeated isolation. Thus, there is a need for new proactive approaches to improve mental resilience and prevent mental health conditions. Since the 1990s, art has emerged as an alternative mental health therapy in the United States and Europe, becoming part of the social care agenda. This article focuses on how visual esthetic experiences can create similar patterns of neuronal activity as those observed when (...) the reward system is activated. The activation of the reward structures could have a stress buffering effect, given the interdependence observed between the reward and stress systems. Therefore, could visual esthetic experiences stimulate mental resilience? And if this were the case, could art-based interventions be offered for mental health in the context of COVID-19 and beyond? (shrink)

BackgroundRecent advancements in neuroscientific techniques have allowed us to make huge progress in our understanding of memories, and in turn has paved the way for new memory modification technologies that can modulate memories with a degree of precision, which was not previously possible. With advancements in such techniques, new and critical ethical questions have emerged. Understanding and framing these ethical questions within the current philosophical theories is crucial in order to systematically examine them as we translate these techniques to the (...) clinic.Main bodyIn this paper, we discuss the ethical implications of modern neuroscience techniques that aim to disrupt or enhance memories. We attempt to frame the MMTs in the context of existing ethical philosophical theories to provide a cohesive analysis of the myriad of ethical quagmires that might emerge from such technologies. We argue the application of Aristotle’s Golden Mean and multiple accounts of authenticity are useful in approaching the ethical questions surrounding MMTs. We then propose a framework in which ethical considerations can be systematically examined. Lastly, we provide caveats and considerations for the use of this framework. Overall, we provide a practical approach for the ethical use of MMTs depending on the situation.ConclusionWhile at face value, our model appears to put severe limitations on the application of MMTs, we are not completely opposed to their use, but rather our framework guides the agent to consider the implications before making any decisions. Most importantly, we argue that the use of MMTs does not reduce the responsibility of the initial decision, and the agent must accept the post-MMT self as the new “true self” regardless of the outcome. As the developmental trajectory of MMTs suggests we are getting closer to practical clinical applications, ethical concerns across a wide range of disciplines need to be addressed to develop best strategies and policies when dealing with MMTs. If this can be achieved, we believe the ethical use of MMTs is not only possible but would also be of tremendous benefit to many people suffering from memory-related mental disorders. (shrink)

In his stimulating and provocative collection of essays, Globalization and Justice, Kai Nielsen defends a cosmopolitan account of global justice. On the cosmopolitan view, as Nielsen understands it, individuals are entitled to equal consideration regardless of citizenship or nationality and global institutions should be arranged in such a way that each person's interest is given equal consideration. Nielsen's defense of cosmopolitan justice in this collection will be of no surprise to readers familiar with his socialist egalitarian commitments. Indeed, the internationalism (...) underlying socialism, Nielsen would argue, naturally entails the cosmopolitan account of justice. (shrink)

Ben shu jie shao le gong zi zhen, wei yuan, yan fu, kang you wei, tan si tong, liang qi chao, chen tian hua, zhang bing lin deng wan qing si xiang jia de zhe xue si xiang.

90 nian dai, Du Weiming xian sheng de geng duo jing li zai yu kai zhan "wen hua Zhongguo" de lun yu."Wen hua Zhongguo" zhuo mo zui duo de shi ru jia de ren wen jing shen, yi jiu zheng jiang ru jia ru shi de jia zhi qu xiang he fan su ren wen zhu yi hun wei yi tan de yin xiang, tu xian ru jia yi mai xiang cheng de pi pan jing shen.

En el Nuevo Testamento griego, el término "kalós" (hermoso, bello) aparece 99 veces y el término "agathós" (bueno), 104. Casi con la misma frecuencia. Se ha traducido y se traduce "kalós" por bueno, lo cual no es exacto. Parece importante retener que Cristo hubiera utilizado tantas veces el concepto de belleza o hermosura, y que invitara al hombre a hacer obras hermosas, a realizar la belleza en su vida. Por eso, según el título de este libro (de 285 págs.), se (...) trata de la belleza no solo que corresponde a la persona de Cristo, sino también la que él comunica a las demás personas, la que se refiere a nosotros por ser obras suyas. Jesús habla de obras "kalá" (hermosas), de frutos "kaloùs" (hermosos) o de corazón "kalê kaì agathê" (hermoso y bueno). La Antigüedad griega también hablaba del hombre "kalòkagathós". Es verdad que todo lo bello es bueno, y viceversa, pero hay que matizar. El propio Jesús se autodenomina "kalós", hermoso, al hablar de sí mismo en el Evangelio diciendo que es el pastor bello. Una palabra clave del presente libro es “razonar”. Los Evangelios son muy escuetos, dicen solo lo imprescindible, fueron vertidos además en otro idioma distinto del que habló Jesús. Hay aspectos que no son comprendidos si no se tiene en cuenta lo razonable. Para comprender el Evangelio no basta con atender al estricto dato teológico contenido en sus textos, tan condensados, sino que es preciso hacer al mismo tiempo una sutil labor filosófica que permita descubrir lo que implícitamente se contiene en ellos. Esta necesaria tarea —liberada de todo fundamentalismo— muestra lo que es más razonable para saber quién y cómo es Cristo. Por ello el libro lleva como subtítulo "Una comprensión filosófica del Evangelio". Y lo hace sirviéndose principalmente de la filosofía de Marías y Ortega, lo cual —a pesar de ser el instrumento intelectual que mejor permite comprender el Cristianismo— no se había realizado todavía. Gracias a ese método, lo primero que se comprende es precisamente la extraordinaria belleza de Cristo y la que comunica a sus discípulos y a quien se hace su servidor, llamado por San Pablo "kalòs", hermoso. Circula la idea, incluso en algunos ambientes católicos, de que la razón y, por supuesto, la filosofía no son aptas para comprender el Evangelio. Este libro, más filosófico que teológico, reivindica el insoslayable papel de la razón, de la filosofía, de lo razonable, para comprender los Evangelios, y debe leerse como un "ensayo de Cristología según la razón vital". Sus consideraciones están hechas a la luz de la razón. No de la razón abstracta, propia del racionalismo, que poco o nada tiene que ver con ella, sino de la razón vital; de la razón sin más. De la razón que conduce a la fe; de la fe que conduce a la razón. El dato histórico, irrefragable, de los cuatro Evangelios postulaba que se estudiara iluminándolo con la razón, sin la cual la fe queda mutilada y coja, abstracta, sin luz propia. Pero la razón había sido frecuentemente vista en ámbitos clericales con malos ojos, con cierta sospecha, sin darse cuenta de que, si es auténtica —y no algo reduccionista—, ilumina, clarifica, disipa las tinieblas. Especialmente porque, en última instancia, la razón procede del Logos, Cristo, la Luz, la Razón por antonomasia, fuente y origen de ella. En el Prólogo de San Juan se unen la razón y la vida; se trata no de una razón abstracta, sino vital. El "Lógos" es entonces la Razón vital. Lejos de ser enemiga de la vida, como sostenían los irracionalistas, la razón es una función vital. Quien recibe al "Lógos" con fe fundada en el amor debe esforzarse por intentar entenderlo con la razón, por buscar su inteligencia. El "Lógos", Cristo, ilumina a quien lo recibe para que se produzca esa comprensión. Los griegos definían al hombre como "zôon lógon échon", el viviente que tiene logos, que tiene razón. Cristo se presenta como el Logos, la Vida ("Zoé") que ha creado a su imagen y semejanza a ese viviente que tiene logos. Luego la razón no se debe subestimar o despreciar, es algo divino; Dios, fuente y origen de toda razón, la Razón misma, desea ser comprendido mediante ella, depositada en cada hombre. «Si la Sabiduría es Dios, el verdadero filósofo es el que ama a Dios», escribe San Agustín. Porque el filósofo es el que ama la Sabiduría, Dios. Jesús dice que «la Sabiduría se ha justificado por sus obras», que «la Sabiduría se ha justificado por todos sus hijos». Los hijos de la Sabiduría, de Cristo, la aman, la justifican, la acreditan, la razonan porque son filósofos. Y la filosofía, el amor a la Sabiduría, es absolutamente necesaria e imprescindible para comprender a Cristo y su Evangelio, que siempre enseña lo razonable. (shrink)

Papers presented cover: new approaches to evolutionary epistemology, new applications, critical evaluations, and the nature of the mind. Paper edition (unseen), $25.50. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

Recently, it has been shown that the perceived times of voluntary movements and their effects are perceived as shifted towards each other. This temporal binding phenomenon was explained by an integrated representation of movement and effect, facilitating operant learning and the experience of intentionality. Here, we investigated whether temporal binding depends on explicit intentional attributions. In Experiment 1, participants intended to either produce or avoid producing an effect by the timing of their movements, with the ratio of success being fixed (...) at 2:1. In Experiments 2 and 3, the influence of the action–effect contingency ratio on temporal binding was controlled for by removing the intentional attribution of the effect. The results indicate that temporal binding is a general associative mechanism that facilitates the learning of movement–effect contingencies. Beyond that, temporal binding is sensitive to explicit intentional attributions, which selectively enhance the link between an intentional movement and the effect a moving agent intends to produce. (shrink)

This article re-examines the role of the brain in self-recognition. It reconsiders the idea that the frontal and cortical midline structures are important for self-specific experience in light of several recent reviews of neuroscience literature. The findings suggests that the frontal cortex and the cortical midline structure are not the only areas involved in self-related tasks and that these areas may be involved not because the tasks are self-specific, but because they are tasks that involve a specific kind of cognitive (...) operation, specifically reflective evaluation. (shrink)

In the first part of this paper we investigate the intuitionistic version $iI\!\Sigma_1$ of $I\!\Sigma_1$ (in the language of $PRA$ ), using Kleene's recursive realizability techniques. Our treatment closely parallels the usual one for $HA$ and establishes a number of nice properties for $iI\!\Sigma_1$ , e.g. existence of primitive recursive choice functions (this is established by different means also in [D94]). We then sharpen an unpublished theorem of Visser's to the effect that quantifier alternation alone is much less powerful intuitionistically (...) than classically: $iI\!\Sigma_1$ together with induction over arbitrary prenex formulas is $\Pi_2$ -conservative over $iI\!\Pi_2$ . In the second part of the article we study the relation of $iI\!\Sigma_1$ to $iI\!\Pi_1$ (in the usual arithmetical language). The situation here is markedly different from the classical case in that $iI\!\Pi_1$ and $iI\!\Sigma_1$ are mutually incomparable, while $iI\!\Sigma_1$ is significantly stronger than $iI\!\Pi_1$ as far as provably recursive functions are concerned: All primitive recursive functions can be proved total in $iI\!\Sigma_1$ whereas the provably recursive functions of $iI\!\Pi_1$ are all majorized by polynomials over ${\Bbb N}$ . 0 $iI\!\Pi_1$ is unusual also in that it lacks closure under Markov's Rule $\mbox{MR}_{PR}$. (shrink)

The main goal of this paper is to present and compare two approaches to formalizing cross-world comparisons like John might have been taller than he is in quantified modal logics. One is the standard method employing degrees and graded positives, according to which the example just given is to be paraphrased as something like The height that John has is such that he might have had a height greater than it, which is amenable to familiar formalization strategies with respect to (...) quantified modal logic. The other approach, based on subjunctive modal logic, mimics the mixed indicative-subjunctive patterns typical of cross-world comparisons in many natural languages by means of explicit mood markers. This latter approach is new and should, for various reasons, appeal to linguists and philosophers. Along the way, I argue that attempts to capture cross-world comparison by means of sentential operators are either inadequate or subject to substantive logical and philosophical objections. (shrink)

1. Xin yi shu chuang zuo lun, Xin yi shu lun ji -- 2. Mian xiang sheng huo, Lun yi shu de ji qiao -- 3. Yi yi dang shi -- 4. Xi wen le jian -- 5. Ge er bu ge -- 6. Lun Feng jie -- 7. Kai xin yue shi -- 8. Bu dao ding dian, Shen mei de min gan -- 9. Zai zai tan suo -- 10. Liao ran yu xin -- 11. Shen mei tan (...) -- 12. Si zeng xiang shi, Yi shen er ren -- 13. Shen mei xin tai -- 14. Hui jian zi ji -- 15. Diao su diao su -- 16. "Fu huo" de fu huo -- 17. Dong fang ji bai -- 18. Shen yu wu you -- 19. Tu na ying hua -- 20. Qu yu wu xie -- 21. Shu xin, ti ci xuan -- 22. Duan jian can pian. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:What's so Important about Music Education?Leonard TanJ. Scott Goble, What's so Important about Music Education? (New York, NY: Routledge, 2010)In What's so Important about Music Education, J. Scott Goble proposes a new philosophical foundation for music education in the United States based on the theory of semiotics by American pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce. Following a brief summary, I will note several merits in Goble's book before sketching four (...) recommendations for future editions.In Chapter One, Goble notes how the inclusion of non-Western musics in the public schools as espoused in the 1967 Tanglewood Declaration has raised two crucial questions: "Whose music should be included in the curriculum?" and "What is the role or social importance of public school music education in the United States as a postmodern society?" Noting that music education was established in the United States during the modern era, and that the Tanglewood Declaration did not account for vast differences in beliefs about music, Goble argues that there is a need to establish a new philosophical foundation that can accommodate the varied beliefs and practices of diverse cultural groups in postmodern United States.In Chapter Two, Goble sketches and critiques five cultural anthropologists. Of the five, he singles out Clifford Geertz's conception of culture as "semiotic [End Page 201] webs" (p. 20) as the conceptual foundation that is appropriate for this study. He then links Geertz's notion of culture to the semiotic theory of C. S. Peirce which is to become the theoretical underpinning of the book. Subsequently, he unpacks many key Peircian themes: human conceptions are maintained not individually but collectively in cultural groups, provisional truth (as opposed to absolute Truth) is relative and dependent on conceptions of communities, and the scientific method is the sole mode of inquiry by which people in communities may use to satisfy their doubts to formulate beliefs. Most importantly, Goble expounds the "pragmatic maxim" that since humans live in communities united by common beliefs, "the 'clear' meaning of an idea held by a member of the community will almost inevitably stem from the beliefs—or ways of understanding—held by members of that community" (p. 30). Goble concludes the chapter by presenting the Peircian semiotic system of cognition which posits that a "sign" is conceptualized in a triadic relationship: the Sign or "Firstness," the Object or "Secondness," and the Interpretant or "Thirdness" (p. 33).In Chapter Three, Goble considers how music is a sign based on the theoretical framework laid in Chapter Two. Drawing on the work of ethnomusicologists, anthropologists, psychiatrists, and a neuroscientist, he formulates a Peircian pragmatic approach to musical practices which posits that "the musical practices of different cultural communities represent a diverse cluster of community-specific ritualized behaviors involving sound" (p. 252). Furthermore, each of the musical practices "serves those persons who meaningfully participate in it as a means of psychophysiological, psychosocial, and/or sociopolitical equilibration relative to the worldview—or ordered conception of Reality—they tacitly share" (p. 252). For Goble, this pragmatist conception of musical practices is neither ethnocentric, universalist, nor relativist, and can serve as a conceptual framework for all diverse musical practices in postmodern United States.With the Peircian pragmatic conception in mind, Goble examines historical factors that contributed to current conceptions of music in the United States in Chapter Four. He laments that as a result of European Enlightenment and three socio-political phenomena in the United States (the separation of church and state, promotion of no other worldview than democracy, and adoption of democratic capitalism), music is no longer pragmatically oriented but trivialized and pursued by self-serving musicians.In Chapter Five, Goble traces the philosophical justifications for music education throughout the history of the United States. While the sign "musical practice" was conceptualized as "worship" in colonial America, the sign "music" was conceived as "art" during the age of Enlightenment, and as "product" during the age of science and technology. Noting that Bennett Reimer's music education as aesthetic education is limited in its Western focus on music as works [End Page 202] of artistic objects, Goble aligns his Peircian conception along praxial lines—in particular, with... (shrink)

Ben shu quan mian chan shu zhu xi de li xue yu ke xue si xiang,Te bie jiu zhu xi zhong shi zi ran yan jiu,Shen ru ke xue tan suo,Chuang xin ke xue si xiang,Chuan bo zi ran zhi shi yi ji zhu xi li xue de ke xue jia zhi zhan kai ju ti de lun shu,Chong fen ken ding zhu xi ke xue si xiang dui yu hou shi ke ji fa zhan de zhong yao zuo yong,Yi (...) qi dui jin tian de ke ji yu wen hua de fa zhan zhu ru yuan tou huo shui. (shrink)

Despite contemporary Confucianism’s aspirations to be a world philosophy, there is an ethnocentric strand within the Confucian tradition, most glaringly exemplified in Han Yu’s attacks on Buddhism. This paper re-assesses Confucian ethnocentrism in the context of contrary practices that indicate a more pragmatic attitude among Confucians toward cross-cultural interactions. It argues that while the ethnocentric tendency serves as constant reminder of the need for vigilance, and recognition of the difficulties of crossing cultural boundaries, there are nevertheless resources within Confucianism for (...) constructing an ethics of communication that is urgently needed to deal with the moral problems of cultural pluralism. The paper analyses the role of various common Confucian virtues such as ren(benevolence, co-humanity), yi (appropriateness), li (ritual), zhi (wisdom) in communication, and argues that a virtue of flexibility is implicit in Confucius’s insistence of bugu and could contribute significantly to a Confucian ethics of communicative virtues. (shrink)

The twelve elegant essays in this slim volume by Robert Cummings Neville, Ritual and Deference: Extending Chinese Philosophy in a Comparative Context, originating in lectures and projects of varying purposes, crystallize Neville’s “Confucian program” of comparative philosophy, which has been taking shape in his earlier works. More accessible than his other monographs, its apparent simplicity is deceptive. While it would inspire and benefit even the novice, only those who have traveled some distance on the same arduous journey would fully appreciate (...) the depth of its understanding and the clarity achieved through struggle with the perennial identity crisis and methodological problems of comparative .. (shrink)

Ben shu dui Luling Wang xue de yan jiu, zhu yao cong yi xia liang fang mian zhan kai: shou xian, zhong dian jie shao le ti chu Luling Wang xue de li lun yi ju he Luling Wang xue fa zhan de ge ge jie duan de jie ding, te dian ji qi zhu yao de dai biao ren wu. Qi ci, ju ti lun shu le Luling Wang xue fa zhan de ge ge jie duan de zui zhu (...) yao dai biao ren wu de zhi xue li lu, xin xue si xiang, jing xue te dian. Tong guo dui Luling Wang xue zong ti shang de yan jiu, gai kuo he zheng li yi ji dui ge ge fa zhan jie duan zhu yao de dai biao ren wu Wang xue si xiang de bu tong shi jiao de tan tao chan fa, cong zong ti shang rang shi ren jiao wei xi tong de liao jie Luling Wang xue de gai mao ji qi cao chuang, fa zhan, ding sheng ji shi wei de li shi guo cheng he zhong yao dai biao ren wu de Wang xue si xiang. Tong shi, zai qian mian yan jiu de ji chu shang, dui Luling Wang xue zai Jiang you Wang xue nai zhi Yangming hou xue fa zhan guo cheng zhong de zhong yao di wei yi ji dui zhong wan Ming ru xue si xiang fa zhan de ying xiang zuo le zong jie. (shrink)

In this paper, we respond to a recent article by Edwin Jesudason regarding the ethical problems associated with kindness in healthcare. Jesudason contends that kindness contributes to unkind outcomes such as discrimination and systemic problems in healthcare. We disagree with his above assertion by forwarding three arguments. First, we question his association of kindness with favouritism through his conflation of favour with favouritism. We counter that doing someone a favour does not necessarily mean that preferential treatment is involved. Second, we (...) object to his interpretation of discretionary kindness as possessing ‘circumscribed scope’, that is, doing favours to the ingroup and leaving out others. We maintain that the discretionary element of kindness does not denote inclusivity and instead refers to the judgement and prudence needed for a person to act kindly in specific circumstances. Our third argument concerns Jesudason’s emphasis on kindness as an action. By focussing on kind acts, he has inadvertently overlooked kindness as a moral value, attitude and inclination of a person. Overall, Jesudason has provided an inadequate explanation of kindness as a virtue. We suggest that a kind person does not promote or condone unkind outcomes such as prejudice, abuses and structural problems in healthcare. Instead, such a person goes beyond discrete kind acts and ingroup loyalty to actively demonstrate compassion, generosity and assistance towards those in need in a spontaneous and consistent manner. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Experiential Roots of Religion The ARE in the Twentieth Century The Decline of Traditional Foundationalism and Stock Objections to RE The ARE via the Principle of Critical Trust (PCT) RE and TE Conceptual Coherence of TE Intracoherence of TE The Structure of the CTA The Impartiality Argument for the PCT Objections to the ARE The ARE in the Twenty‐First Century References.

In the first chapter of Karl Marx's Theory of History, G. A. Cohen contrasts Marx's image of history with Hegel's, contrasts, that is, a powerful form of historical idealism with historical materialism. Historical idealism stresses the “dominion of thought” ; social change, on such an account, is to be explained principally in terms of changes in consciousness, the course of history being determined by fundamental ruling ideas and conceptions. This view is to be contrasted with historical materialism. The central vision (...) of history in Hegel is formulated as follows by Cohen, “History is the history of the world spirit which undergoes growth in self-knowledge, the stimulus and vehicle of which is a culture, which perishes when it has stimulated more growth than it can contain”. Marx's vision, a historical materialist vision, is identical in structure with Hegel's, but endows the structure with a new content. This can be seen from the parallel formulation of it, given by Cohen: “History is the history of human industry, which undergoes growth in productive power, the stimulus and vehicle of which is an economic structure which perishes when it has stimulated more growth than it can contain. (shrink)

This article explores Mencius’ extension of moral feelings and its potential to address a key challenge in cosmopolitan education: how to motivate students to expand their existing affection and obligations towards their family and community to the rest of the world. Rather than strong universalism, a Mencian orientation is aligned with rooted cosmopolitanism that takes into account localised and cultural contexts that underpin, determine and give value to social practices. Mencius’ approach, as argued in this essay, highlights the spontaneous human (...) reactions to ethical situations, innate human goodness, analogical reasoning, moral character and agency. A Confucian form of cosmopolitan education gives emphasis not only to the students’ moral imagination but also their instinctual responses, self-reflection and rationality. Such an education seeks to integrate emotions and reasoning through the utilisation of paradigm scenarios that identify and reinforce the natural compassionate feelings in the learner. (shrink)

Self-realizationist theories are among the classical attempts to develop a comprehensive normative ethical theory. Plato and Aristotle, in giving classical statements of such theories, argue that a man's distinctive happiness, a man's distinctive flourishing, will only be realized when he realizes himself, i.e. when he achieves to the fullest possible degree his distinctive function. And to achieve one's function is to develop to the full those capacities which are distinctive of the human animal. In doing this we are being most (...) truly ourselves and in doing this we are doing what it is our own nature to do. Men who cultivate to the fullest that which men and only men have will be the happiest men and in so acting they will realize themselves most fully; they will achieve their maximum potential or their fullest distinctively human growth. To so realize oneself is the final end of all moral activity. It defines what is to constitute ‘the good life’ and what is to count as ‘a good man’. (shrink)

We investigate a variant of the variable convention proposed at Tractatus 5.53ff for the purpose of eliminating the identity sign from logical notation. The variant in question is what Hintikka has called the strongly exclusive interpretation of the variables, and turns out to be what Ramsey initially (and erroneously) took to be Wittgenstein's intended method. We provide a tableau calculus for this identity-free logic, together with soundness and completeness proofs, as well as a proof of mutual interpretability with first-order logic (...) with identity. (shrink)

Stephen Barker (The Philosophical Quarterly, 47 (1997), pp. 195–211) has presented a new argument for a pure material implication analysis of indicative conditionals. His argument relies crucially on the assumption that general indicatives such as ‘Every girl, if she gets a chance, bungee‐jumps’ are correctly analysed as having the formal structure (for all x)(if x gets a chance, x bungee‐jumps). This paper argues that an approach first proposed by David Lewis must be pursued: the ‘if’‐clause in these sentences restricts the (...) quantifier. Only the Lewis‐style analysis can deal with sentences involving non‐universal quantifiers such as ‘Most letters are answered if they are shorter than 5 pages’. I show that Barker's reasons for rejecting the restrictor analysis are not cogent and that the restrictor analysis connects widely with recent work in natural language semantics. (shrink)

ARGUMENT ABOUT whether in any significant sense we can derive an ought from an is has been persistent and intractable. Fifteen to twenty years ago it was orthodoxy in analytical philosophical circles to claim that for all their other differences Hume and Moore were right in agreeing that in no significant sense can we derive an ought from an is. At present there is no orthodoxy or even anything like a dominant view and, given our current understanding of how language (...) works and our understanding of moral and ideological discourse, we could not possibly reasonably remain content with old orthodoxies or take the question to be as straightforward as it was often thought to be. (shrink)